Allen v. State Board of Elections(1969) (emphasis added). The food stamps cannot be used to buy wine. We note, however, that only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. White v. Regester, supra, at 766. 6 This is not to say that a group that has been afforded roughly proportional representation never can make out a claim of unconstitutional discrimination. in relevant part). Because appellants here stated such a claim, the District Court erred in dismissing their complaint. of Ed., supra, at 282-283 (plurality opinion). Race in redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme. depends on these twin elements. d. Suppose that patients in a certain control group are awake from 7 A.M. to 10 P.M. What is the average body temperature of such a patient over this wakeful period? But it did not purport to overrule Gomillion or Wright. BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 676, STEVENS, J., post, p. 676, and SOUTER, J., post, p. 679, filed dissenting opinions. By perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the same racial group-that they think alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates-a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. The Attorney General did not object to the General Assembly's revised plan. That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains underrepresented in the state legislature - whether that group is defined by political affiliation, by common economic interests, or by religious, ethnic, or racial characteristics. *, JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Pp. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977). Dissenting Opinion (Harlan):. Id., at 477. Nonetheless, in those cases where this cause of action is sufficiently pleaded, the State will have to justify its decision to consider race as being required by a compelling state interest, and its use of race as narrowly tailored to that interest. In Beer, we held that a reapportionment plan that created one majorityminority district where none existed before passed muster under 5 because it improved the position of racial minorities. Instead, it is the State that must rebut the allegation that race was taken into account, a fact that, together with the legislators' consideration of ethnic, religious, and other group characteristics, I had thought we practically took for granted, see supra, at 660. But as JUSTICE WHITE points out, see ante, at 672 (dissenting opinion), and as the Court acknowledges, see ante, at 647, we have held that such principles are not constitutionally required, with the consequence that their absence cannot justify the distinct constitutional regime put in place by the Court today. But we have held that such principles are not constitutionally required, with the consequence that their absence cannot justify the distinct constitutional regime put in place by the Court today. the latter two of these three conditions depend on proving that what the Court today brands as "impermissible racial stereotypes," ante, at 647, are true. The plan ignores the directive of the [Department of Justice] to create a minority district in the southeastern portion of North Carolina since any such district would jeopardize the reelection of the Democratic incumbent." It is ironic that it does so when white voters challenge a law that would have North Carolina send a black representative to Congress for the first time since Reconstruction, here is no constitutional requirement of compactness or contiguity for districts. Proc. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 - which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization - North Carolina submitted to the Attorney General a congressional . Although the State argues that it had a strong basis for concluding that remedial action was warranted, only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the Act's requirements and without regard for sound districting principles. Croson, supra, at 500 (quoting Wygant, supra, at 277 (plurality opinion)). Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids districting plans that will have a discriminatory effect on minority groups. Nor, because of the distinctions between the two categories, is there any risk that Fourteenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny about "benign" racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny.7. Id., at 151-152 (emphasis added). In 1991, a group of white voters in North Carolina challenged the state's new congressional district map, which had two "majority-minority" districts. to Brief for Federal Appellees 16a. It rejected the argument that race-conscious redistricting to benefit minority voters is per se unconstitutional. In Gingles the Court considered a multimember redistricting plan for the North Carolina State Legislature. I respectfully dissent. It is also unnecessary to decide at this stage of the litigation whether the plan advances a state interest distinct from the Act: eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. 1973c, the General Assembly passed new legislation creating a second majority-black district. cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. Indeed, the Voting Rights Act and our case law make clear that a reapportionment plan that satisfies 5 still may be enjoined as unconstitutional. ("United Jewish Organizations properly is viewed as a case in which the remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination encompassed measures to improve the previously disadvantaged group's ability to participate, without excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity-meaningful participation in the electoral process") (emphasis added). Thus, we express no view as to whether "the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more," always gives rise to an equal protection claim. Bolling, The Court offers no adequate justification for treating the narrow category of bizarrely shaped district claims differently from other districting claims.9 The only justification I. But their loose and imprecise use by today's majority has, I fear, led it astray. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. For example, on remand North Carolina might claim that it adopted the revised plan in order to comply with the 5 "nonretrogression" principle. In Wright, for example, the facts might have supported the contention that the districts were intended to, and did in fact, shield the 17th District from any minority influence and "pack" black and Puerto Rican voters in the 18th, thereby invidiously minimizing their voting strength. Legislation that classifies a person or group of people solely based on their race is, by its nature, a threat to a system that strives to achieve equality, the majority opined. Under 5, the State remained free to seek a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia notwithstanding the Attorney General's objection. The VRA required an increase in the representation of minority groups. Once the Attorney General has found that a proposed redistricting change violates 5's nonretrogression principle in that it will abridge a racial minority's right to vote, does "narrow tailoring" mean that the most the State can do is preserve the status quo? 392, 397 (WDNC 1992). Appellants stated an equal protection claim by alleging that North Carolina's reapportionment scheme was so irrational on its face that it could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters based on race, and that separation lacks sufficient justification. Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. Thus, for example, awarding government contracts on a racial basis excludes certain firms from competition on racial grounds. For the following sentence, locate the action verb and underline it twice. Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. against anyone by denying equal access to the political process. (referring variously to "strict scrutiny," "the standard of review employed in Wygant," and "heightened scrutiny"); id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) ("strict scrutiny"); id., at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (classifications" 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives'" (quoting Regents of Univ. Statement 67a-lOOa (Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and For Temporary Restraining Order). See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 341 (1960) (voters alleged to have been excluded from voting in the municipality). Supp., at 475-477 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). In other words, the "analytically distinct claim" the majority discovers today was in plain view and did not carry the day for petitioners. Id., at 133 (emphasis added). The Attorney General, acting through the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, interposed a formal objection to the General Assembly's plan. See post, at 684 (dissenting opinion). It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. The facts of this case mirror those presented in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as a per se matter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. A. Croson Co., supra, at 493; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 484 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C. 9 The Court says its new cause of action is justified by what I understand to be some ingredients of stigmatic harm, see ante, at 647-648, and by a "threa[t] to our system of representative democracy," ante, at 650, both caused by the mere adoption of a districting plan with the elements I have described in the text, supra, at 685. In 1993, about 20% of the state population identified as Black. As stated above, five Justices were of the view that, absent any contention that the proposed plan was adopted with the intent, or had the effect, of unduly minimizing the white majority's voting strength, the Fourteenth Amendment was not implicated. Wygant, supra, at 295 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). In districting, by contrast, the mere placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right. See Tr. A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression. As for this latter category, we. In the meantime, our human resources manager will send you an application form. But nothing in our case law compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny. Appellants allege that the revised plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, consti-. Docket no. The case established that any legislative redistricting must be strictly scrutinized and that any laws related to racially motivated redistricting must be held to narrow standards and To date, we have held that only two types of state voting practices could give rise to a constitutional claim. Carr. Of particular relevance, five of the Justices reasoned that members of the white majority could not plausibly argue that their influence over the political process had been unfairly canceled (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by REHNQUIST and STEVENS, J.J.), or that such had been the State's intent (STEWART, J., POWELL, J., concurring in judgment). Again, however, the equal protection inquiry should look at the group's overall influence over, and treatment by, elected representatives and the political process as a whole. Given two districts drawn on similar, race-based grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the other simply by virtue of being snakelike, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned and absent any evidence of differential racial impact. The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 340 (1960). ); id., at 175-179 (Brennan, J., concurring in part); id., at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. The majority-minority district that is at the center of the controversy is, according to the State, 54.71% Mrican-American. UJO, 430 U. S., at 162165 (opinion of WHITE, J. In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the use of racial gerrymandering in North Carolina's reapportionment plan. See 364 U. S., at 341, 346. Accordingly, they held that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Constitution's, NORTH CAROLINA CONGRESSIONAL PLAN Chapter 7 of the 1991 Session Laws (1991 Extra Session). It reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole. -using race in redistricting is as important of it being continuous. Shortly after the complaint in Pope v. Blue was filed, appellants instituted the present action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. As we explained in Feeney: "A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only. Ostensibly race-neutral devices such as literacy tests with "grandfather" clauses and "good character" provisos were devised to deprive black voters of the franchise. Might the consumer be better off with $2,000\$2,000$2,000 in income? v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. 4 The majority's use of "segregation" to describe the effect of districting here may suggest that it carries effects comparable to school segregation making it subject to like scrutiny. UJO, supra, at 151-152. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. 42 U. S. C. 1973c; see also 1973b(f)(2). of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 291 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Petitioners'. Indeed, as a brief survey of decisions illustrates, the Court's gerrymandering cases all carry this theme-that it is not mere suffering at the polls but discrimination in the polity with which the Constitution is concerned. Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than race," Arlington Heights, supra, at 266, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. e., an intent to aggravate "the unequal distribution of electoral power." 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